Volume 29
Issue 1 Wilderness: Past, Present, and Future
Winter 1989

Maine v. Taylor - Natural Resource Statutes against the
Commerce Clause or When is a Hughes Not a Hughes but a Pike
D. Lee Shields

Recommended Citation
D. L. Shields, Maine v. Taylor - Natural Resource Statutes against the Commerce Clause or When is a
Hughes Not a Hughes but a Pike, 29 Nat. Resources J. 291 (1989).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol29/iss1/18

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository.
For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

MAINE V TAYLOR
NATURAL RESOURCE STATUTES AGAINST THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
OR WHEN IS A HUGHES NOT A HUGHES BUT A
PIKE?
In Maine v. Taylor, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state
statute that banned the importation of live baitfish into Maine. The
Court determined that there were no nondiscriminatory alternatives
available to protect against the possible harm to Maine's aquatic
ecosystem.'
INTRODUCTION
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce. . . among the several States .... "2 Since 1824, 3 that power has
limited state regulations that burden interstate commerce. Congress' power
only limits state action; it does not, however, absolutely preclude state
power to affect commerce. "[Tlhe states retain authority under their police
powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern', even though
interstate commerce may be affected." 4 A state statute challenged under
the Commerce Clause is upheld if it regulates evenhandedly with only
incidental effects on interstate commerce. If, on the other hand, the statute
discriminates against interstate commerce on its face or in practical effect,
it will be set aside unless the legitimate local purpose cannot be accomplished by any less discriminatory alternatives.- For a facially discriminatory or defacto discriminatory statute to overcome that stricter judicial
scrutiny, the State must demonstrate the importance of the local purpose,
that the burden to interstate commerce is incidental or that less discriminatory alternatives are not available. 6
The Supreme Court in Maine v. Taylor allowed Maine's facially discriminating Live Bait Statute 7 to stand. The Court applied the strict scrutiny test and found that the statute's purpose was a legitimate concern
that could not be satisfied with any less discriminatory alternatives to
interstate commerce.
I. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
3. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
4. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
5. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
6. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
7. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7613 (1981) reads: "A person is guilty of importing live bait
if he imports into this State any live fish, including smelts, which are commonly used for bait fishing
in inland waters."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Robert J. Taylor operated a baitfish business in Maine. He was unable
to obtain from in-state fisheries the number of baitfish he wanted for the
season, so he arranged to import 158,000 live golden shiners, a common
baitfish, from out of state. Such importation violated a Maine statute
prohibiting importation of live baitfish. The golden shiner shipment was
intercepted and Taylor was indicted under the Lacey Act.'
Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine's
statute violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
and therefore could not form the basis for federal prosecution under the
Lacey Act. The District Court of Maine denied the motion to dismiss.'
Taylor then entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to
appeal the constitutional question. Maine intervened to defend the validity
of its state statute. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,
finding that the Maine statute impermissibly restricted interstate trade.' 0
The United States Supreme Court found Maine's statute banning the
importation of live baitfish constitutional under the Commerce Clause
because even though it was facially discriminatory, it served a legitimate
local purpose and no less discriminatory alternatives were available.
BACKGROUND
COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINTS ON STATE CONTROL OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
Natural resources "have acquired special significance in [this] age of
anxiety over shortages .... "" Efficient use of natural resources concerns
both the individual states and the nation as a whole. The Commerce
Clause fosters efficient use of resources by encouraging the free flow of
goods across state lines, and by prohibiting states from engaging in economic protectionism. Sometimes, however, states perceive the need to
protect their natural resources for environmental, not economic, reasons.
Then the Commerce Clause must mediate between apparently conflicting
aims, state conservation and the national interest in promoting a free
market in natural resources. 2 In the battle between conservation and
8. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. § § 3371-3378. The Lacey Act makes it a federal
crime "to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign
commerce ... any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or
"
regulation of any State ..
9. United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393 (D. Me. 1984).
10. United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1985).
1I. Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of
Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. RFv. 51, 71 (1980).
12. E.g., H.P Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949); Raymond Motor Transportation v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978); City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M.
1983), later proceeding, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984); Hellerstein, supra note 11.
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unrestricted interstate commerce, the Supreme Court plays a major role
balancing the states' and the national interests. The Supreme Court has
had this4 role in the past, 3 but it has become a more frequent one in recent
years. 1
The question arises as to what power is reserved to the state over the
natural resources within its borders. The term "natural resources" encompasses a broad category, including the environment and wildlife. The
Supreme Court has legitimized the use of state police power to protect
the environment and wildlife within state borders. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the protection of public health through the preservation
of the environment is a valid, and indeed primary, objective of the police
power. " Preservation of wildlife, as integral to the environment, has been
determined to be within the scope of the police power of the state.' 6
Within certain
limits, state police power is valid even if it affects interstate
7
commerce. '
The State may retain broad authority to regulate its natural resources
but it is still restrained by the Commerce Clause. All challenged state
natural resources regulations must pass Commerce Clause scrutiny. No
special dispensation exists for any kind of natural resource regulation,
all are considered according to the same general rule.'" That has not
always been the case, however.
The Supreme Court over time has changed its policy regarding Commerce Clause limitation of state wildlife laws and regulations. In the past,
the states had greater authority under sovereign rights to pass preservation/
conservation laws. In the late 1800s, Connecticut prevented the exportation out of state of game birds killed within its borders based on the
state's sovereign capacity. 9 The Court has since rejected the notion of
sovereign rights in this context 2 and now uses judicially derived tests
13. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); West
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923).
14. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Tennessee
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941
(1982); City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983), later proceeding, 597 F
Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
15. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).
16. "We consider the States' interests in conservation and protection of wild animals as legitimate
local purposes similiar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens."
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).
17. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).

18. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
19. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) ("The ownership of wild animals, so far
as they are capable of ownership, is in the state, not as a proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity,
as the representative and for the benefit of all its people in common.").
20. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
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that balance the state's interest in creating the state statute against the
federal interest in unrestricted commerce between the states.7'
The Court applies different tests depending on the statute. These judicial
tests distinguish two types of state statutes. The first are statutes that
"regulate . . . evenhandedly to effect a legitimate local public interest"
and burden interstate transactions only incidentally. 2' The second are those
statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce either on their face
or in practical effect.2 3
The tests applied to these different types of statutes have different
presumptions built into them. Statutes that fall in the first category are
presumed valid and are upheld absent a rebuttal of that presumption.
When a statute is shown to fall into the second category, it is subject to
greater judicial scrutiny than a nondiscriminatory statute and must rebut
a presumption of invalidity.2 4
These judicial tests have defeated a variety of state statutes in the past.
The statute struck down in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.2' is an example
of the first type of statute, one that regulates evenhandedly.
Pike involved an Arizona statute, the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable
Standardization Act, that required all cantalopes grown in Arizona and
shipped out of state for sale to "be packed in regular compact arrangement
in closed standard containers approved by the supervisor. . .. " The stat-

ute guaranteed that cantalope grown in Arizona would reach the market
and the public labelled as coming from Arizona, thereby enhancing the
Arizona growers reputation. Bruce Church Inc., a commercial farming
operation in both Arizona and California, was shipping the cantalope it
grew in Arizona uncrated 31 miles, across the border, to its processing
and packing facilities in California, which labelled the cantalope as coming from California. Arizona wanted Bruce Church to build a packing
plant in Arizona so that cantalope grown in Arizona would be labelled
as coming from Arizona. The Court found that the burden to interstate
commerce of having Bruce Church build an unneeded packing plant 31
miles from the present site so as to be within the Arizona border, outweighed the putative local benefit of enhancing the reputation of the
cantalope growers in Arizona.
The test articulated and used by the Court to evaluate the statute in
Pike was a summarization of all of the tests used in the past to evaluate
state regulations under the Commerce Clause. That test considered three
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Id.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2447-48 (1986).
Id.
Pike, 397 U.S. 137.
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factors: 1) whether the statute regulates evenhandedly with only incidental
effects on interstate commerce or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; 2) whether the statute serves
a legitimate local purpose; and if so, 3) whether alternative means could
promote the local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce. The state's interest is then balanced against the federal interest
in unrestricted trade. Once a legitimate purpose is found that purpose is
upheld unless the burden to interstate commerce outweighs the putative
local benefits. The Court found the statute in Pike unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause because the benefit to Arizona did not outweigh
the burden to interstate commerce.
The second type of test used for statutes, which facially or de facto
discriminate, applies to the Maine statute in Maine v. Taylor. Statutes
scrutinized under this test have also been repeatedly defeated under the
Commerce Clause. Some have been defeated because a legitimate local
purpose was not sufficiently demonstrated26 while others have been defeated because less discriminatory alternatives to interstate commerce
were available.27
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey28 is an example of a facially discriminating statute that was defeated because the state did not sufficiently
demonstrate a legitimate local purpose. The statute prohibited the importation of waste from out of state. The Court declined to characterize
the statute's purpose but disallowed its legitimacy stating that "whatever
New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce . . . unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently."' 29 The Court rejected
the parallel to quarantine laws offered3" and discounted the notion of a
difference in waste between states.3
The lack of nondiscriminatory alternatives was not discussed in Philadelphia's majority opinion, but the dissent, written by Rehnquist with
Chief Justice Burger joining, stated that safer "methods of disposing of
solid wastes are still in the development stage and cannot presently be
used." '3 2 This view in the dissent of Philadelphia set the stage for the
26. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
27. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
28. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617.
29. Id. at 626-27.
30. Id. at 630. Quarantine laws are laws that prohibit the importation of items "which on account
of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence and death, such as rags or
other substances infected with germs of yellow fever or the virus of small-pox ....
Id. at 631
(quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888)).
31. Id. at 629.
32. Id. at 630 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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majority opinion in Maine eight years later which allowed Maine's statute,
banning the importation of live baitfish, to stand based on the lack of
available alternatives.
Two cases that involved state statutes defeated because there were less
discriminatory alternatives to interstate commerce available were Hunt v.
WashingtonState Apple Advertising Comm'n"3 and Hughes v. Oklahoma."'
In Hunt, North Carolina had a statute that prohibited the display of apple
grades, other than the U.S. grade, on closed containers of apples sold in
North Carolina. North Carolina asserted that the statute was protecting
the consumer from fraud and deception due to the multiplicity of state
grades for apples. Washington state had its own labelling system which
was widely recognized as having superior grades than those required
under the USDA standards. Washington was using its own grades, packaging its apples in closed containers for shipment with its grades displayed
on the package, and selling its apples in North Carolina in these closed
containers. The North Carolina statute essentially banned importation of
Washington state apples. The Court in Hunt allowed the legitimacy of
the purported purpose of North Carolina's facially neutral statute. However, the Court struck down the statute because nondiscriminatory alternatives to an outright ban of Washington state apples were available.
These alternatives were 1)double labelling, and 2) banning state grades
inferior to corresponding USDA categories.
In Hughes v. Oklahoma, another facially discriminatory statute failed
the judicial tests because less discriminatory alternatives were available
that would burden interstate commerce less. Hughes stands for two major
propositions: 1)that the state's sovereign rights theory to game killed
within its borders could no longer be applied to protect resources" and
2) that courts should apply the "strict scrutiny" standard for facially
discriminatory or de facto discriminatory statutes."
William Hughes operated a commercial minnow business near Wichita
Falls, Texas. He purchased a load of naturally seined minnows from a
licensed minnow dealer in Oklahoma and transported them to Texas in
violation of an Oklahoma statute.3 7 Hughes challenged the constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute and won.
33. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
34. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
35. Id. at 335 (overruling Geer).

36. Id. at 337.
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, §4-115 (B) (Supp. 1978). Section 115 (B) states "[n]o person may ship
or transport minnows for sale outside the state which were seined or procured within the waters of
this state except that: . . 2. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit sale and shipment of minnows
raised in a regularly licensed commercial minnow hatchery." The prohibition is against transporting
and selling only "natural" minnows.
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The Court determined the invalidity of the statute using the three factors
of the Pike test: 1) whether the statute regulated evenhandedly with only
incidental effects on interstate commerce, or did it discriminate against
interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; 2) whether
the statute served a legitimate local purpose; and 3) whether there were
less discriminatory alternatives against interstate commerce available that
would promote the local purpose as well.38 Also, a finding that the statute
was facially or de facto discriminatory against interstate commerce invokes "the strictest judicial scrutiny of any purported local legitimate
purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." 39 This
strict scrutiny presumes invalidity of the statute and the burden of proof
switches to the state. The state bears the burden of rebutting that presumption as well as demonstrating that the statute is valid under other
Commerce Clause restrictions.' The Hughes test of strict scrutiny is
therefore triggered whenever discrimination against commerce is demonstrated, either by the party challenging the statute or because the statute
is discriminatory on its face.
Oklahoma's statute was facially discriminatory and therefore subject
to the strict scrutiny test. The strict scrutiny test required the state to
overcome a presumption of statutory invalidity. In addition, Oklahoma
would still have to satisfy the other Commerce Clause restrictions articulated in Pike.
Oklahoma's purpose was found to be legitimate. The Supreme Court
found that Oklahoma's "interests in conservation and protection of [the
wild minnow was a] legitimate local purpose similar to . . . [the interest
of] protecting the health and safety of [its] citizens."'" However, the
Court also found there were alternatives available that burdened interstate
commerce less and would accomplish the same purpose. Therefore, the
statute was repugnant to the Commerce Clause. 42 Oklahoma failed to
overcome the presumption of invalidity.
Maine v. Taylor is a notable exception to these previous Supreme Court
decisions where resource statutes succumbed to Commerce Clause analysis. Theoretically, in Maine v. Taylor, the same judicial tests articulated
in the cases detailed above were used in evaluating Maine's statute.
However, by an eight to one decision, the Supreme Court found that
Maine's Live Baitfish statute was constitutional. The statute was facially
38. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
39. Id. at 337.
40. Id. at 336.
41. Id. at 337.
42. Id. A state may not "force those outside the State to bear the full costs of 'conserving' the
wild animals within its borders when equally effective nondiscriminatory conservation measures are
available."
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discriminatory, subject to the strict scrutiny test of Hughes which required
the state to overcome a presumption of invalidity. The Court, after analysis, found that Maine had sufficiently demonstrated a legitimate local
purpose that could not be served as well by available, less discriminatory
alternatives. Maine's statute was declared constitutional, a lone survivor
of Commerce Clause analysis in spite of being subjected to the strict
scrutiny test. What was the difference?
ANALYSIS
On its face, Maine v. Taylor departs from past Supreme Court precedent
regarding discriminatory state natural resource statutes. Both the balancing test announced in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. and the strict scrutiny
requirement from Hughes v. Oklahoma tended to defeat discriminatory
natural resource statutes in the past, but in Maine the Supreme Court
relaxed its application of these test standards. In Maine, the court applied
the Pike test and found both prongs were satisfied even under the Hughes
strict scrutiny requirement for discriminatory statutes. The difference appears to be that there was a less stringent demonstration required of the
legitimate local purpose prong of the Pike test than in previous Commerce
Clause cases.
The baitfish statute in Maine was discriminatory on its face and therefore triggered the Hughes requirement of strict scrutiny. The burden was
on Maine to justify its baitfish statute and to prove that the statute did
not contravene the Commerce Clause. To justify its statute, Maine had
to show that the statute served a legitimate local purpose and that there
were no alternatives that discriminated against interstate commerce less.
Maine had to rebut the presumption of invalidity and fall within the general
rule articulated in Pike. This factfinding is the purview of the district
courts.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the necessity of strict scrutiny and
supported the district court's findings, stating that "the empirical component of that scrutiny, like any other form of factfinding, 'is the basic
responsibility of the district courts, rather than appellate courts."' 43 Only
when district court findings are "clearly erroneous" do appellate courts
set aside their findings." The Supreme Court did not find that the district
court erred in its factual assessment.
The findings of fact offered by Maine to justify its baitfish statute, as
initially determined by the district court and reviewed by the Supreme
43. Maine v. Taylor, 447 U.S. 131, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2451 (1986) (quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982), quoting DeMarco v. United States,
415 U.S. 449, 450 n. (1974)).
44. Id.
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Court, established both a legitimate local purpose for the statute and a
lack of alternatives that would satisfy that purpose. The district court first
analyzed the legitimacy of the stated local purpose.
The district court found that "a state's interest in conservation and
protection of wild animals is a legitimate local purpose. . ."4 The state
supported its conservation position with two suppositions. First, that
imported golden shiners might have any of three particular parasites, the
effect of which on the native golden shiner population was uncertain.
Maine's second supposition to support its conservation position was that
exotic or nonindigenous species might be inadvertently introduced and,
if they were, they "would alter the existing environmental balance by
increasing competition for food and habitat, as well as in other ways
which cannot be accurately predicted."46
The first supposition was based on the fact that there were baitfish
outside the state of Maine that did have parasites. In attempting to prove
its position, Maine did not establish with certainty whether or not the
imported fish would have the parasites, or whether the parasites would
cause damage even if the fish did have them. Taylor's expert testified
about one of the parasites, capillariacatastomi, saying that it was "debatable whether the parasite [capillariacatastomil is a true pathogen...
this parasite [capillaria catastomi] is most commonly associated with
malnutrition and that it is the malnutrition, and not the parasite, which
causes the problems of stunted growth in bait fish." 4 7 The effect of the
other two parasites, pleistophora ovariae and bothriocephalus opsalichthydis, was also uncertain. Even Maine's expert wasn't aware of any
studies confirming or denying pleistophoraovariae's impact in the wild
and he found no bothriocephalusopsalichthydis present in Taylor's shipment.4"
The second supposition concerning exotic species introduction to native
waters was based on probability statistics.49 The state did not show that
exotic species would be introduced. Maine only showed that exotic species could be introduced into Maine's waterways through baitfish shipments. Exotic species could also be introduced other ways. One of Maine's
own witnesses, a fish pathologist from the Maine Department of Inland
Fisheries and Wildlife, indicated that exotic fish could just swim over the
border. 50
Maine did not uphold its burden of proof. Maine did not prove that
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

United States v. Taylor, 585 F.Supp. 393, 395 (D. Me. 1984).
Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 395, 396.
Id. at 396.
United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 762-63 (1st Cir. 1985).
Id. at 762 n. 12.
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importation of live baitfish would damage its waterways, it only conjectured possibilities. The state only showed that there was a possibility of
either or both of the two suppositions happening. 5' Allowing conjecture
to undermine Commerce Clause scrutiny may create special dispensation
for environmental regulations.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that calling a statute a health
measure doesn't create special dispensation for environmental or health
laws under the Commerce Clause. 2 Special dispensation would allow
states to bypass Commerce Clause scrutiny by labelling their statutes as
health measures. "A different view, that [an] ordinance is valid simply
because it professes to be a health measure, would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no restraints on state action other than
those laid down by the Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance
where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against
interstate goods."'" However, Maine v. Taylor may have changed that
rule.
Environmental and health laws may now have special dispensation and
may no longer be subject to strict scrutiny under Hughes in practical
effect. The Magistrate in United States v. Taylor 4 reasoned, and both the
district court and the Supreme Court agreed with the finding, "that the
'strictest scrutiny' standard mandated by Hughes v. Oklahoma.. .cannot
be read to preclude a state from acting where the evidence on the effectiveness of [] alternatives is in doubt and where the potential disruptive
impact is great. 5 The court also found "that the constitutional principles
underlying the commerce clause cannot be read as requiring the State of
Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental
damage has occurred or until the scientific community agrees on what
disease organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such
consequences."5
Under the application of Hughes strict scrutiny as applied in Maine,
the burden of proof may be a lighter load than previously required to
establish legitimate local purpose in order to defeat Commerce Clause
restrictions. In the future, showing that a possibility of harm exists may
be all that is required of the state to rebut the strict scrutiny presumption
of invalidity of its statute.
After concluding that the state of Maine had a "legitimate interest in
guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the
51. Id.
52. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979).
53. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
54. United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984).
55. Id. at 398 (cite omitted).
56. Id. at 397.
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possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible,'" the Supreme
Court moved onto the second prong of the Pike test. The second prong
determines whether or not there are less discriminatory alternatives that
would accomplish the legitimate purpose and burden interstate commerce
less. The Court found that "outright prohibition of entry, rather than some
intermediate form of regulation, is the only effective method of protecti[on]." 8 The district court finding that there were no scientifically
accepted techniques for the sampling and inspection of live baitfish was
a question of fact to which the Supreme Court acquiesed, stating that
"the record probably could not support a contrary finding." 5 9 The Court
rejected the Court of Appeals' findings that there were alternatives to a
complete ban of the importation of live baitfish.w
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court relaxed its standards in Maine. The burden on the
states to defeat Commerce Clause scrutiny of their discriminatory natural
resource wild life statutes has been lessened. Relaxation of the strict
scrutiny standard could cause problems in the future.
A standard that enables environmental statutes to defeat Commerce
Clause restrictions based on possible detrimental effects will cause great
uncertainty in future cases. A fertile imagination visualizing and articulating for the court detrimental effects kept within the range of possibility,
could control the courtroom. And yet the standard articulated in Maine
allowed such uncertainty of effects to defeat Commerce Clause restrictions.
Also under Maine a new interpretation of Commerce Clause principles
was offered, accepted and transformed into law. "[Tlhe constitutional
principles underlying the commerce clause cannot be read as requiring
the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible
environmental damage has occurred or until the scientific community
agrees on what disease organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts
to avoid such consequences." 6' Potential damage and variance of opinion
in the scientific community may in the future give states legislative leeway
in drafting discriminatory environmental statutes without fear of Com57. Maine v. Taylor, 447 U.S. 131, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2453 (1986).
58. Id. at 2453 n.19 (quoting Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 43 (1980)).
59. Maine, 477 U.S. at 146, 106 S. Ct. at 2452.
60. United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 762-63 (Ist Cir. 1985). The Court of Appeals listed
five alternatives. 1) imported baitfish could be required to have certificates guaranteeing freedom
from disease; 2) Maine could conduct its own inspections of out-of-state fish at its borders; 3) Maine
could send inspectors to hatcheries in other states and require the exporter to pay for the inspection;
4) a restriction on the number and size of importations; 5) Maine could use sampling techniques
similiar to those employed by Maine on other fresh water fish.
61. United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984).

302
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merce Clause defeat. The burden no longer appears to be on the state to
justify legislation that affects commerce. The state seems required only
to demonstrate uncertainty and contradictory opinions among experts to
bear its burden of proof.
The decision in Maine has altered the standard of strict scrutiny under
which discriminatory statutes are evaluated. Substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects of a particular environmental statute now shift the
burden of proof back onto the challenger of a facially or de facto discriminatory statute. The strict scrutiny presumption of invalidity has been
shifted and discriminatory statutes are no longer treated any differently
under Commerce Clause scrutiny than statutes that regulate evenhandedly.
The Supreme Court has misapplied the Hughes test. Under the Hughes
label, the Court in Maine applied the Pike test, thereby blurring the
distinction between the two.
D. LEE SHIELDS

